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ABSTRACT  Since the end of Cold War and especially since the onset of “the War on Terror” 
under the George W. Bush Administration, the political and militarized character of humanitar-
ian action and aid, which had already long been politicized, has been reinforced. This was 
observed especially when civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) started to take place in the 
1990s. Various actors, including aid recipient governments, local rebel groups, donor govern-
ments, and the military—in particular the U.S. Government and military—as well as the so-
called Islamic “terrorist” organizations have been (mis)using aid and NGOs. As a result, 
already weak or non-existent humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, and indepen-
dence are being lost. Divisions of roles between aid workers and military actors have become 
blurred as the latter are suspected to have morphed into humanitarian aid workers. While a 
military is involved in combat and simultaneously conducts humanitarian operations, using a 
“winning hearts and minds strategy,” this situation puts at risk both the civilians caught in the 
conflict and civilian aid agencies. This has led to increased mistrust, fear, suspicion, and inse-
curity among local recipients towards aid agencies and aid itself, which resulted in aid workers 
losing access to recipients.
Key Words: Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC); “The War on Terror”; Humanitarian 
principles; Winning “hearts and minds.”
INTRODUCTION
Since the 1990s, humanitarian assistance in areas affected by conflict(1) has 
drawn attention worldwide due to the end of the Cold War, which resulted in the 
collapse of some states. The end of the Cold War has allowed humanitarian actors, 
which include both the United Nations (UN) and Non-Government Organizations 
(NGOs), increased access to all sides of many ongoing conflicts and to the ris-
ing humanitarian needs related to conflicts in Africa and the Balkans—partially 
due to the advancement of Information Technology. This contrasts with the Cold 
War whose realpolitik prevented humanitarian organizations from operating in 
conflict areas, except for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 
Competing vetoes by major powers on both sides of the East-West division often 
prevented the UN from dealing with these conflicts.
Over the course of the 1990s, as humanitarian agencies expanded in number, 
size, and role, one important initiative was taken: civilian organizations, such as 
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and NGOs, engaged in coop-
eration with the military in crisis response, leading to the expression “civil- 
military cooperation” (CIMIC). This practice was initiated in the aftermath of the 
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1991 Gulf War, which produced Kurdish refugees. CIMIC’s objective was to 
mutually supplement both organizations’ strength, in other words, civil organiza-
tions’ delicate service to the vulnerable groups and the military’s logistics capac-
ity; this cooperation continued in Bosnia, East Timor, Afghanistan, and Haiti. This 
increasing trend of CIMIC, as described below, has enabled military organizations 
to “use and co-opt humanitarian assistance as an integral part of warfighting ... 
essential to the success of the military intervention” (Lischer, 2007: 100).
On the other hand, a number of humanitarian organizations have been con-
cerned that CIMIC could negatively affect, among other things, the humanitarian 
principles. In addition, the issue of militarization of refugee camps, which are 
meant to maintain civilian and humanitarian space, became more visible. These 
difficulties, such as non-respect for and militarization of humanitarian space, led 
to the UN Security Council (UNSC) opening an unprecedented debate in 1997 
on the provision of military protection for humanitarian operations in high-risk 
areas and protection for humanitarian assistance to refugees (UNSC, 1997). How-
ever, these two issues are not entirely new, but have been ongoing during and 
even before the Cold War. Humanitarian principles have been indeed “patchy, 
weak or simply non-existent” (Barnett & Weiss, 2011: 12) in the conflict context 
possibly ever since its proclamation in 1965 by the International Conference of 
the Red Cross and Red Cresent Movement. Government actors and guerrilla fac-
tions, which relied heavily on financing from the superpowers during the Cold 
War, stopped receiving financial support from them. Thus, the local actors were 
obliged to seek available resources in the 1990s elsewhere, one of which was 
humanitarian assistance.
This paper will argue that humanitarian aid, which has long been politicized, 
has reinforced its political and militarized character since the end of the Cold 
War and especially since the onset of the War on Terror following the attacks of 
September 11, 2001. It is not merely the recipient governments and local rebel 
groups, but also the foreign governments and troops, in particular the U.S., that 
have been misusing aid. As a result, humanitarian principles are completely being 
lost, and the humanitarian organizations have been facing more difficulty in access-
ing aid recipients, including refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and 
those who are forced to remain due to their inability to move to safe areas. This 
is because these recipients have become more cautious and fearful of receiving 
aid from the agencies.
After examining the nature of humanitarian action and aid, this paper will ana-
lyze how various actors have undertaken the political and military transformation 
of humanitarian aid, especially since the 1990s. The concerned parties include 
both the local and international actors, the latter of which comprise the U.S. 
Government, as well as the so-called Islamic “terrorist” organizations. The nature 
of humanitarian action and aid includes its principles, the dividing line between 
civilians and the military, and the attitude of donor countries and of aid recipi-
ents. The examples of Africa’s Great Lakes region in the 1990s and of East Africa 
and the Horn of Africa in the 2000s will be used, whose regions were respec-
tively affected by the post-Cold War context and “the War on Terror.”
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THE NATURE OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION/ASSISTANCE
Mary B. Anderson’s Do No Harm: How Aid can Support Peace—or War (1999) 
had an enormous impact on policymakers, as if it were the first book question-
ing whether aid was doing more harm than good. However, Barbara Harrell-
Bond’s Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees (1986) as well as 
others, had already pointed out similar problems back in the 1980s. The basic 
elements of these critiques need to be thoroughly reviewed as humanitarian action 
and assistance, whose objective is to save lives, has been easily misrepresented. 
The term “humanitarian” is often used in an ambiguous and manipulative way 
in order to escape critiques and to avoid a certain political inaction by “politi-
cal” organs such as the UN General Assembly and the UNSC (Chimni, 2000: 
244; Warner, 1999). “Humanitarian” often signifies “an abnegation of responsibil-
ity by those in power” (Warner, 1999), and terms like “humanitarian crisis” or 
“complex emergencies,” which in fact means political emergencies, have been 
used to replace phrases like “civil war” (Lischer, 2003: 106).
It is generally said that humanitarian action has become a substitute for Western 
military and diplomatic intervention into some of the post-Cold War crises (Pomfret, 
1997). One of the typical examples is France’s intervention in Rwanda during 
the genocide in 1994; although France presented it as a strictly “humanitarian” 
action, it apparently intended to facilitate the flight of its ally, the former Rwandan 
army soldiers to eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and to oppose 
an Anglophone (Rwandan rebel group) incursion into a francophone country 
(Prunier, 1999: 281, 284). However, humanitarian action becoming a substitute 
for Western intervention does not apply only to post-Cold War crises. In 1977, 
during the riot by anti-President Mobutu dissidents, the same French intervention 
was justified in the DRC as a “humanitarian” intervention to protect the DRC 
against the Communist peril, to save European residents, and also to save President 
Mobutu himself, who was the strong ally of France (McNulty, 1999: 64). It should 
be noted that this term “humanitarian” probably started to spread during the 19th-
century rule of Belgium’s King Leopold II in the Congo. During that time, he 
amassed a personal fortune for his own profit and aggrandizement and “justified 
his genocidal exploitation ... by advancing civilization as a humanitarian project” 
(Barnett & Weiss, 2011: 39). At that time, the Great Power scramble for colonies 
gave birth to the term “humanitarian intervention” that would become familiar a 
century later (Barnett & Weiss, 2011: 39). Many colonial powers rationalized the 
use of military force in humanitarian terms, and they often chose areas of imme-
diate strategic and economic interest (Barnett & Weiss, 2011: 39).
In fact, contrary to Pomfret’s above-mentioned statement, aid itself must be 
regarded as “a convenient form of political action” (Cutts, 1998: 4). As the for-
mer UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, used to say, “there are 
no humanitarian solutions to humanitarian problems because the problems were 
caused by political factors.” Indeed, all humanitarian activities in and out of con-
flict zones are political because it is likely that various actors possess hidden 
agendas, thus political exploitation of aid is a principal condition of existence. 
Likewise, Christian NGOs have been used for political and evangelical aims. For 
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example, the Lutheran World Federation has spread the message of Christ through 
education, development, and medical aid programmes, often accompanied by reli-
gious instruction (Ghandour, 2003). During the 1980s, World Vision distributed 
numerous bibles to Cambodian refugees in the camps, which were generally 
Buddhist strongholds. Bible-reading was compulsory in the schools, and the organ-
ization staff have even reportedly promised American visas to converts. As a 
result, about three-quarters of the 500 NGOs operating on the Cambodia/Thailand 
border have sought converts. In Nigeria, U.S. fundamentalist Protestants have 
practiced the forced baptism of Muslim children and Christian prayers by Muslim 
patients at the hospitals (Ghandour, 2003).
(MIS)USE OF HUMANITARIAN AID BY LOCAL ACTORS
As the international aid organizations’ access to recipients increased in the post-
Cold War era, the fact that aid has been manipulated by local recipient actors—
both the governments and rebel groups—has become more visible and evident. 
Three main manipulative ways, which are inter-connected, will be illustrated below.
First, material aid and administrative cost of aid organizations, which implies 
resources, can promote militarization through its diversion, looting, and informal 
taxing by armed groups. In particular, humanitarian goods—especially food and 
drugs—are used for their own consumption, for barter or sale, and even for export 
(Predergast, 1996: 22). The former Rwandan Hutu government officials who sought 
sanctuary in Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire, taxed the refugees, selling the 
emergency relief on the black market and using the profits to enrich themselves 
and purchase arms. According to the U.S. government official, in one camp alone, 
the former Hutu government was able to earn $6 million a year from weapons 
purchases (Pomfret, 1997). This can easily become part of a self-sustaining war 
economy, supported by northern donors.
The administrative cost of aid organizations comprises office and house rents, 
salaries of personnel, transport contracts including fuel, storage contracts, import 
duties, permits, visas, and port or airport charges levied on humanitarian organi-
zations and personnel, which are major sources of foreign currency for war lead-
ers and their financiers. In Somalia, for example, individual armed guards, employed 
by the relief agencies, benefited enormously and were able to increase the net-
work of contractors and commanders’ access to aid work (Predergast, 1996: 26). 
Aid provided to third-party “security forces,” such as the Congolese Special Forces 
hired by UNHCR to protect the refugee camps in eastern DRC, often went into 
the pockets of corrupt military officials (Predergast, 1996: 26).
Moreover, as many arms used in some battles are generally flown in on hijacked 
aid agency planes, former Congolese President Mobutu’s army also hijacked UN-
chartered planes to transport weapons to fight against the rebels (Pomfret, 1997). 
These planes, under the gaze of international aid workers, flew into UN-run ref-
ugee camps where the arms were distributed to Rwandan Hutu refugees, former 
soldiers, and militiamen, some of whom were involved in Rwanda’s 1994 mas-
sacres and had become Mobutu’s first line of defense. At the same time, the anti-
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Mobutu rebel army, backed by the Rwandan army, also stole aid trucks—which 
was evident as the rebels did not repaint the logos of aid organizations—and 
helped improve their transport capacity again under the disguise of international 
aid organizations. In addition, the rebels flew on stolen aid fuel, which was used 
to ferry 300 troops and their weaponry (Pomfret, 1997).
Second, in some cases, the provision of material aid symbolizes power. Human-
itarian assistance is used to bolster the actors’ international recognition and polit-
ical goals because aid enables the extension of “state power at a local level” 
(Shearer, 2000: 191). For example, during the civil war, the Angolan government 
made the local population believe that humanitarian assistance was provided by 
the government, not by the international aid organizations. This was disadvanta-
geous for the rebel group, as lack of access to aid distribution affected the elec-
toral constituency (IRIN, 2002). Aid can also cause people to move from one 
place to another (Khan, 1981). In the 1980s, the famine relief to southern Sudanese 
refugees in neighboring countries helped the Sudanese government to depopulate 
some areas of the south, especially those with a high concentration of oil (Keen, 
1998: 58). Aid and aid agencies have been used as “bait” to lure refugees and 
other beneficiaries. In Zaire, while the Hutu extremists gathered Rwandan refu-
gees at one camp and controlled the aid distribution in 1994, Rwandan-backed 
rebels also misused aid agencies to attract refugees from where they had been 
hiding. The Burundian and Ugandan officials respectively lured the Rwandan ref-
ugees under false pretenses with promises of food, then forced them onto trucks 
to be repatriated to Rwanda.
Third, some guerrilla commanders have grown sophisticated, using the human-
itarian agencies and aid for their military strategy, such as creating a forward 
garrison in order to act as a buffer zone for the principal garrison of the warring 
commander in southern Sudan (Predergast, 1996: 21). The governments in Sudan 
and Ethiopia used aid shipments to transport arms to garrisons, which gave incen-
tives to rebels to attack these shipments (Keen, 2008: 125). By inviting aid pro-
viders to a particular location, in a “hearts and minds” campaign—to be explained 
below—local leaders often established themselves as “legitimate” authorities in 
the eyes of the civilian population. The benefits were so enormous that in some 
cases, war leaders intentionally exacerbated malnutrition to attract more aid 
(Predergast, 1996: 20). In other cases, joint collaboration with the warring author-
ities in needs assessments could sometimes facilitate their roles in pressuring 
humanitarian organizations for increased aid, enabling agencies to inaccurately 
assess information because of (deliberately) incorrect translations or intimidation 
(Predergast, 1996: 26). International organizations partnering with “indigenous 
NGOs,” which could act as fronts for military factions, is another method for 
war leaders to generate resources (Predergast, 1996: 26).
(MIS)USE OF HUMANITARIAN AID BY INTERNATIONAL ACTORS
Apart from the local actors, international actors also (mis)use aid mostly for 
political objectives. Donor governments have often deployed humanitarian agen-
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cies as shields in conflict areas, so they can claim that they are taking appropri-
ate actions in response to crises (Lischer, 2003: 106). Provision of large-scale 
humanitarian aid to the Rwandan refugees in Zaire and Tanzania right after the 
genocide aimed to “disguise the international inaction” in relation to the genocide 
(Keen, 2008: 118). In 1995–1996, large U.S. Air Force transport planes landed 
very frequently at the airport in Rwanda, supposedly to carry aid for the geno-
cide victims. It was, nevertheless, suspected that the bulk of the aid could not 
have been merely for the genocide survivors, “who never reported any particular 
largesse on the part of the Americans” (Prunier, 2009: 126–127).
Furthermore, with the global developments of the 2000s, such as the military 
campaigns related to the “war on terror” and the establishment of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), divisions of roles between aid workers and other actors 
have become blurred as the former are being used to gather intelligence (Ferreiro, 
2012). A typical example was observed when Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir 
in 2009 reacted defiantly to his arrest warrant for war crimes in Darfur by the 
ICC. He announced the expulsion of 13 international aid organizations, which 
were believed to have provided information to the ICC. Indeed, some of these 
NGOs that had monitored the human rights situation of IDPs could have com-
piled information, used by the ICC. Subsequently, Sudan continued to expel aid 
workers repeatedly for various reasons, including the fact that UNHCR distrib-
uted “rape-detection devices” to several relief groups working in Darfur (BBC, 
2010). Indeed, as humanitarian actions correspond with military, judicial, and 
political forms of interventionism, humanitarian and political-military agendas have 
also become blurred, which increased violence against aid workers and led to 
loss of access to beneficiaries (Allié, 2011). It is not only the ICC that may have 
used Western NGOs for information gathering, but also the U.S. Government that 
clearly cooperated with American NGOs for intelligence purposes.
I. (Mis)Use of NGOs and of Aid by the U.S. Government
NGOs and aid have often been used in order for Western countries, especially 
the U.S., to access some strategic areas. For example, the International Rescue 
Committee (IRC), founded at the request of Albert Einstein in 1933 in order to 
assist the Jewish refugees, has been suspected to have been working on behalf 
of the U.S. Government. In order to overthrow Congolese President Mobutu, the 
IRC has provided “half-humanitarian, half-military support” in eastern DRC 
(Prunier, 2009: 127), having installed anti-aircraft artillery in two capital cities in 
eastern DRC. In addition, the IRC provided food aid, instead of wages, to the 
civil servants of the rebel administration (Reyntjens, 2009: 68). The IRC was also 
said to have transported weapons at the onset of the Second Congo War in 1998, 
while all the UN and international NGO personnel fled eastern DRC.(2)
In particular, after September 11, American NGOs are gradually acting on behalf 
of the U.S. Government. Then-Secretary of State Colin Powell called aid work-
ers “force multipliers” in the war effort. Although this practice is not new for 
American NGOs, it was the first time a U.S. Secretary of State had made such 
a public statement. Powell also declared, “[we are] all committed to the same, 
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singular purpose to help humankind…in need, who is hungry, who is without 
hope” (Powell, 2001). In other words, he implied that civilian humanitarian aid 
workers and the military share the same values, so their efforts should be com-
bined in order to mutually reinforce their influence.
In 2010, Richard Holbrooke, the former U.S. Special Representative for 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, made it clear that the U.S. Government had relied on 
NGOs for information gathering (Burns, 2010: 3). In fact, cooperation for infor-
mation exchange purposes between the CIA and the NGOs has been strengthened 
in the 1990s, when a major humanitarian crisis took place in Africa’s Great Lakes 
region (CIA, 2008). Unlike embassy officials, NGOs are deployed throughout the 
various regions, including remote areas, thus have abundant information on the 
local situation; this could reinforce policy making by the U.S. Government. In 
addition, NGOs’ ability to obtain and collect information has improved with the 
spread of information technology and their growing size and professionalism (CIA, 
2008).
At the same time, the U.S.-led coalition force in Afghanistan provided local 
humanitarian aid in exchange for some important and sensitive information on 
the whereabouts of Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders (OXFAM, 2011: 19; MSF, 2004b). 
The U.S.-led coalition force indeed admitted to threatening local residents using 
humanitarian aid as bait for information, delivering more aid to those who helped 
with news (Lischer, 2007: 105). In Pakistan, the CIA used a surgeon to obtain 
bin Laden’s DNA under the guise of conducting an immunization survey 
(Washington Post, 2014). Following this incident, another UN doctor was shot 
during the polio immunization campaign, which the Taliban suspected was a cover 
for espionage.
Similar use of humanitarian and development aid started to be used in the Horn 
of Africa as part of a post-2003 regional “War on Terror” strategy, which has 
fallen under the U.S. African Command (AFRICOM) since 2008. As a tool to 
justify its intervention and for the U.S. presence to be well accepted in the local 
communities in the Horn of Africa, the U.S. Government and military have used 
the slogan “win hearts and minds” (Dickinson, 2009; Bradbury & Kleinman, 2010: 
4). According to the U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual, “‘[H]earts’ 
means persuading people that their best interests are served by [counterinsurgency] 
success. ‘Minds’ means convincing them that the force can protect them and that 
resisting is pointless” (Department of the Army Counterinsurgency, 2006: Appendix 
A, A-26). Nevertheless, as explained below, it became clear that this strategy was 
not productive.
II. (Mis)Use of Aid by Islamic “Terrorist Organizations”
Islamic NGOs, which have developed steadily since the early 1980s, may also 
have been used for terrorism operations. To recall, in the aftermath of the 1998 
bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the political role of Islamic 
NGOs has become prominent. Members of Al-Qaeda possessed the ID cards of 
an NGO. Posing as aid workers, they lived in the NGO’s office in Kenya and 
planned the bombing (Africa Confidential, 2014: 6). One NGO, which was not 
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involved with any relief activities, has been used by Al-Qaeda as a cover orga-
nization (Africa Confidential, 2014: 6). Five NGOs were investigated by Kenyan 
police and the FBI, while five other Islamic NGOs were banned (Salih, 2004: 
175). This clampdown on Muslim NGOs has led to increasing restrictions on the 
flow of funds from the Gulf and Middle East states.
Following these U.S. Embassy bombings, the Dadaab refugee camps, situated 
in north-eastern Kenya, started to be regarded as recruiting and training grounds 
for “terrorist organizations.” Reportedly, the recruitment was organized by Kenyan 
government officials and Somali exiles in Kenya (Human Rights Watch, 2009a). 
Due to Dadaab’s location in the politically and economically marginalized desert 
area, unemployed youth tend to be easily tempted by Al Shabaab and Al Qaida 
(Burns, 2010: 11). According to the UN and local government, apart from the 
fact that small arms traffickers operate (Austin, 2002), Al Shabaab has been mobi-
lizing combatants in these refugee camps, who are tempted with false promises 
of lavish pay and claims of support from the UN and the U.S. (Human Rights 
Watch, 2009a). One of the main funding sources of Al Shabab is charity (Masters 
& Sergie, 2009), and most humanitarian aid to Somalia consists of food aid, 
which is susceptible to diversion (UNSC, 2010: para. 234). Furthermore, about 
15% of the rent is to be paid to Al Shabaab when landlords lease their property 
to the UN and NGOs (Hansen, 2013: 91, 115). For the resident permit in the Al 
Shabaab-controlled area, Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) has contributed $10,000 
in tax in the form of khat (Hansen, 2013: 91).
In addition, following the September 11 attacks, “terror” networks’ tendency to 
abuse Islamic NGOs started to emerge as a global issue with suspicions that some 
terrorist groups might have misused Islamic NGOs as front organizations (Kagwanja 
& Juma, 2008: 176). It appeared that Somali radical Islamist organizations had 
been present in the camps, such as al-Ittihad al-Islami, linking with Al Qaeda 
and Islamists in Taliban Afghanistan (Kagwanja & Juma, 2008: 222). Moreover, 
al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, the sole Muslim charity agency in Dadaab, man-
ages religious schools and distributes rice, sugar, and other commodities that are 
not even provided by the World Food Programme (Kagwanja & Juma, 2008: 
222). Providing camel and goat meat during Ramadan was indeed the organiza-
tion’s way to win the “hearts and minds” of many Somali Muslim refugees 
(Kagwanja & Juma, 2008: 222–223).
CONSEQUENCES OF HUMANITARIAN AID IN “THE WAR ON TERROR” 
OPERATION
As a result of the misuse of aid by various actors for political and military 
objectives, two main consequences have arisen: loss of humanitarian principles 
and higher risk to local aid recipients.
I. Contradiction of Humanitarian Principles
As mentioned above, humanitarian principles have long been non-existent, but 
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“the War on Terror” military initiative and humanitarian principles have now 
become more contradictory. The main humanitarian principles include neutrality, 
impartiality, and independence. Neutrality implies that humanitarian actors must 
not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, reli-
gious, or ideological nature. Impartiality ensures that humanitarian action must be 
carried out on the basis of need alone, giving priority to the most urgent cases 
of distress and making no distinctions on the basis of nationality, race, gender, 
religious belief, class, or political opinions. Independence means that NGOs them-
selves make decisions without any influence from governments or other sponsors.
Even though humanitarian action does not aim to support any political or mil-
itary organization or rebel groups, initiating aid operations in the field necessi-
tates direct negotiation with the de facto authorities, who could be the rebel 
groups identified as “terrorists.” This implies that aid agencies are indirectly coop-
erating or taking sides with the belligerents who are generating victims, and this 
action undermines neutrality. In 2010, the U.S. enacted legislation to crack down 
on “material support” for organizations and individuals the State Department iden-
tified as “terrorists” or a “threat to U.S. national security and foreign policy” 
(Weissmen, 2011). This legislation not only bans assistance to groups themselves, 
but also the humanitarian aid itself provided to territories under control of these 
groups, with exemptions for medicine and religious materials (Humanitarian Policy 
Group, 2011: 4). In this situation, maintaining neutrality is not just difficult but 
also impossible.
Moreover, the growing tendency for aid to be deployed according to military 
objectives shows that humanitarian actors, especially those who are directly or 
indirectly involved in “the War on Terror”, violate conflict neutrality. This is 
because “the War on Terror” with a clear government agenda is partial, whereas 
neutrality means theoretically not taking any sides. Assistance thus becomes another 
weapon in favor of the military, “which can condition, deny or reward relief to 
those who fall in or out of line with its larger security agenda” (Hofman & 
Delaunay, 2010). In addition, not favoring one warring faction over another is 
often impossible as one group could deserve strong condemnation as the clear 
perpetrators. As Terry states, “refusing to make a judgement about who is right 
and who is wrong in many ways assumes a legal and moral equality between 
oppressors and their victims” (Terry, 2002: 22). Indeed, silence in the name of 
neutrality supports the abuse-of-power relationship between various perpetrators.
Impartiality is also non-existent if, as is often the case, the needs on one side 
of a group are greater than on the other, in which case aid is provided in an 
unbalanced manner to the former (Terry, 2002: 22). Thus, depending on how vis-
ible and audible the needs are, one party often receives more than the others. 
This lack of impartiality was obvious in 1999, when the people in Kosovo were 
provided aid that amounted to $1.23 per person, whereas the refugees in Africa 
were given merely 11 cents per person (New York Times, 1999). Western nations 
naturally supported their neighbors in Europe more than the needy people in 
Africa. In addition, most humanitarian organizations select their places of activ-
ity largely according to the security situation, accessibility to the needy people, 
and needs of the donors themselves—especially for the information-gathering 
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objective—and not necessarily according to the needs of the recipients. As a 
result, aid has become “constraint-based” and “threat-based” rather than “needs-
based” (Hofman et al., 2010), although humanitarian aid should not buy informa-
tion, be kept free of charge, and “be neither obliged by law nor owned as com-
pensation for harm done” (MSF, 2004a).
Following the September 11 attacks, donor countries and international organi-
zations have changed their attitude, causing some NGOs to malfunction. Some 
donors have become more cautious and conservative when dealing with potential 
partners on aid funds in order not to be misused by terrorist groups (Howell & 
Lind, 2009: 145). As a result, some Islamic agencies were obliged to stop their 
operations due to shortages or lack of funding. The fact that the UN has desig-
nated al-Shabaab as a terrorist organization has disabled NGOs operating in areas 
they control from taking UN funds (Bradbury, 2010: 14).
Finally, independence is another contradictory issue for all humanitarian orga-
nizations, which remain primarily Western enterprises accepting financial support 
from Western/NATO governments (Brassard-Boudreau & Hubert, 2010). That 
NGOs have long been supported by the superpowers is a well-known fact (Hulme 
et al., 1997; Terry, 2002: 74–75). Due to this generous support, NGOs can hardly 
remain independent, and their policies and activities are easily driven by the donor 
countries. A USAID Administrator even warned that all humanitarian aid groups 
were being viewed as an “arm of the U.S. government,” and if aid groups did 
not agree with recognition, he would then look for other partners (InterAction, 
2003).
Among all the principles, it is important to question whether neutrality is fea-
sible when civilians are deliberately targeted by armed groups during the conflict. 
Kaldor claimed that the rate of civilian deaths from the conflict dramatically 
increased since the end of the Cold War, highlighting that this targeting of civil-
ians was one of the characteristics of “the New War” following the end of the 
Cold War (Kaldor, 2007: 2), which is not entirely true. This practice has been 
ongoing because it is most likely that data on civilian deaths was systematically 
underestimated before the data improved in the mid-to-late 1980s (Malander et al., 
2009: 515). In particular, when major battles do not take place, such as in the 
case of the eastern DRC (Yonekawa, 2016), forced displacement of civilians can-
not be an unintended consequence of war, but rather an objective as well as tac-
tic of the warring parties. Forced displacement by armed groups involves not just 
the removal of whole groups and individuals from their home areas, but it also 
serves military, political, and economic functions. These can be classified into 
five types: first, robbing and looting civilians’ belongings; second, clearing land 
so that access to mining areas and/or grazing area for cattle can be gained where 
residents happen to live, allowing them to undertake forced labor (Muggah, 2006: 
123); third, incorporating civilian groups into armed groups (Johnson 2003, 155); 
fourth, punishing anyone who collaborates with the opponents who are consid-
ered a “mortal enemy” (Human Rights Watch, 2009b: 54); and fifth, producing 
victims intentionally in order to demonstrate that the battle is ongoing—though 
there is hardly any fighting—and to attract humanitarian aid. In this situation, 
how can neutrality be maintained?
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II. Higher Risks to Local Recipients
This leads to the second point. The most problematic interaction between the 
militaries and the civilian agencies in a conflict context is that when a military 
is involved in combat and simultaneously conducts humanitarian operations, this 
situation puts at risk both the civilians caught in the conflict and civilian agen-
cies providing assistance (Das, 2007: 40). What is rarely discussed is that aid 
organizations that take sides with populations at risk, who are in general consid-
ered to be the “mere” victims of conflict, can be perceived to be taking sides in 
the conflict itself.
There are two reasons. First, apart from the opinion makers, some residents 
could easily favor one warring faction over others for ethnic, religious, or other 
reasons. Second, armed groups could be deliberately hidden among the civilian 
population for the purpose of self-defense, and thus the “civilian group,” which 
is used as a shield by armed groups, can be considered not to be neutral by any 
conflict actors. The typical example was when Rwandan Hutu armed extremists 
were amidst the Hutu refugees in the refugee camps in Congo and Tanzania in 
1994–1996, leading the newly established government in Kigali to perceive all 
refugees as anti-government. At the same time, the aid organizations that were 
working in the refugee camps were also considered to be anti-Rwandan govern-
ment, because their aid reinforced the Hutu extremists on the one hand, while, 
on the other hand, most aid organizations did not work inside Rwanda even after 
the end of genocide in 1994.
Since the 1990s, when the field of humanitarian aid started to expand, various 
actors have become more involved in it, including private security firms. The so-
called “humanitarian soldiers,” the military actors taking on humanitarian charac-
teristics (Lischer, 2007: 108), are not only the military personnel morphing into 
aid workers, but also some aid workers who may morph into military-like fig-
ures. This can be considered as aid workers’ collaboration with “enemies” of aid 
recipients (Hofman, 2011). The Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, 
which consist of both military and civilian components, are typical examples. In 
order to conduct humanitarian reconstruction projects under a “hearts and minds” 
strategy, these teams were condemned by humanitarian organizations because 
“such operations create a security threat for NGO workers who could be mis-
taken for military personnel” (Lischer, 2007: 104).
After having monitored activities against Al Qaeda and collected intelligence, 
the local aid recipients in Somalia were well aware of the strategic motives of 
the U.S. Marines and the use of humanitarian activities, which was merely to 
cover up their presence (Bradbury & Kleinman, 2010: 57). This was clear in 
Afghanistan, when U.S. planes dropped cluster bombs on suspected Taliban forces 
and at the same time dropped food packets for civilians. However, these two 
payloads were difficult for local residents to distinguish since both of them were 
packed in the same color (Lischer, 2007: 104).
Another example demonstrates a cover-up; when schools and latrines were ren-
ovated by the U.S. marines, a religious leader in north-eastern Kenya said,
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Why does the most powerful country in the world come all the way here 
to repair—not even build—a public latrine? Do they think we are stupid? 
(OXFAM, 2011: 23–24)
The local residents highly suspect that aid projects such as borehole drilling 
and provision of veterinary drugs were in reality a cover for harmful activities 
such as the burying of nuclear waste and killing local people’s animals (Bradbury 
& Kleinman, 2010: 52; Kenya Somali Consortium, 2008). The machines donated 
by the U.S. military to drill boreholes easily broke down in three months, while 
the borehole drilled by the Kenyan government lasted for 30 years (Bradbury & 
Kleinman, 2010: 62). Even the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa has 
been involved with Quick Impact Projects, such as constructing schools and mobile 
veterinary clinics. However, there is no clear indication that this “War on Terror” 
strategy has improved security; on the contrary, the presence of U.S. troops has 
made local residents feel more insecure than before (Bradbury & Kleinman, 2010: 
5).
Local residents are suspicious that the humanitarian aid is a mere means for 
the U.S. military to surveil the local Muslim residents, whom the U.S. regards 
as hostile (Bradbury & Kleinman, 2010: 52). The local communities are aware 
that aid has a risk of being a “weapon” that sacrifices their lives, and thus refuse 
to accept aid (Bradbury & Kleinman, 2010: 58). This threat-based humanitarian 
principle and blurring of civil-humanitarian and military purposes has generated 
fear and caution among the recipients.
These negative attitudes among Islamic authorities and populations towards 
humanitarian aid have affected its access and its delivery. Some aid agencies, 
which are simply regarded by some belligerents as extensions of Western gov-
ernments, have been confronted by Al-Shabaab over their relationship with for-
eign governments and their potential agendas towards Al-Shabaab (Bradbury, 2010: 
9, 12). Although the relationship remains unclear, the immunization survey in 
Pakistan mentioned above seemed to have an impact on Al-Shabaab banning vac-
cination campaigns and kicking out humanitarian agencies, because they were 
“collecting data under the guise of demographic surveys, vaccinations reports, 
demining surveys, nutrition analyses…, and analyses for dishonest policies and 
programmes” (Al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, 2011). Two U.S. NGOs were also 
expelled from Al-Shabaab-controlled areas in 2008 for allegedly spying and gath-
ering intelligence that led to the assassination of an Al-Shabaab leader in a U.S. 
air strike (Humanitarian Policy Group, 2011: 8). Food aid bearing the logo of 
the U.S. flag and school textbooks delivered by the U.S. have also been banned 
(Bradbury, 2010: 9). Indeed, as McNamara (2003) claims, meeting the need of 
aid agencies for a secure political and military environment for their operations 
without being regarded as humanitarian cover for strenuously contested political 
action remains a challenge.
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CONCLUSION
For a lengthy period, humanitarian action and aid has signified power, bait, 
and resources, often used as a shield not only by the local governments and war-
ring parties but also by foreign governments. Humanitarian aid was also used for 
a religious purpose, such as Christian NGOs to convert Buddhist refugees and 
Islamic NGOs to help their people under the “hearts and minds” strategy. How-
ever, the use of humanitarian aid or action for military and political strategy 
started to be reinforced in the post-Cold War era, when both the number of 
humanitarian actors—from government, NGOs, and even the military—and their 
access to aid recipients have increased, together with the development of CIMIC. 
Islamic NGOs were also suspected of being supported and manipulated by terror 
networks. These militarized and political characteristics of humanitarian aid even 
strengthened and became more obvious following the “War on Terror” when the 
U.S. high government officials made such public statements. Western NGOs, and 
American NGOs in particular, were used for information gathering on the “ter-
rorist” organization or potential crimes against humanity committed by conflict 
actors.
As a result, the distinction between civilian and military or “terrorist” organi-
zations, and between humanitarian space and the battlefield, has become blurred 
due to the morphing of both humanitarian actors and the military; beyond that, 
the difference between aid material and military devices is often unclear. Most 
importantly, the objective of aid, which is primarily to save lives and to meet 
the needs of recipients, has gradually become ambiguous and threatening in the 
eyes of the civilian population. While the “winning hearts and minds” strategy 
by Islamic NGOs may work for Muslim refugees, the same strategy by the U.S. 
military simply has generated mistrust and suspicion among the Islamic recipient 
community. Due to this suspicion about misused aid, donors are becoming hesi-
tant to fund NGOs working in a “terrorist”-designated area, and the local Islamic 
community has rejected receiving aid, which has become a weapon in favor of 
the military.
All this implies that humanitarian principles, which have been weak and non-
existent since its creation, have been lost. Moreover, humanitarian actors’ access 
to recipients, which increased in the post-Cold War era, has dramatically decreased 
following the September 11 attacks. In particular, the Islamic communities, which 
may be regarded as “enemies” of the U.S. Government and military, can remain 
more vulnerable without outside assistance. While the aid recipients are the most 
affected by this “War on Terror”, humanitarian aid workers have also become 
victims of the conflict between the so-called Islamic “terrorists,” which have used 
Islamic NGOs as cover organizations, and “the War on Terror” operations of 
Western governments.
In order not to aggravate the concern that “aid can do more harm than good,” 
further analysis of the changing nature of humanitarian principles, and of the 
Western agenda and “terrorist” organizations’ strategy on “the War on Terror” 
operations is of particular importance.
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NOTES
 (1) The term conflict is used in this paper to signify armed conflict.
 (2) The author learned this while deployed in eastern DRC as a UNHCR staff member.
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